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Many analysts agree that the creation of the Russia-NATO Council has left Vladimir Putin isolated at home, hostage
of his foreign policy and security establishments, without qualified and willing people to make it succeed and with
public opinion suspicious, if not directly afraid, of the Western threat. However, as recent events are showing, the
future  of  the  Russia-NATO  Council  does not  depend exclusively,  or  even  fundamentally,  on  Russian  domestic
reaction but also on the security policies pursued by the West, above all by the U.S. and the EU as a whole. These
policies have implications for Putin’s pro-Western policy at home. Depending on their nature they can facilitate or
hinder Putin’s ability to sell his foreign policy course internally. At present, they seem to be hindering more than
facilitating Putin’s stance among the Russian security and foreign policy establishment.
Perception of threats to Russian Security
The Security Concept of the Russian Federation approved in September 2000 leaves one thing clear: Russia is facing
new security threats while the old ones still persist. At present, the primary dangers to Russian society are of an
internal  nature:  the  economy, terrorism, separatist  movements,  environmental  degradation. In  this sense, the
Concept reflects what is in the minds of most Russians. According to the surveys undertaken by William Zimmerman
between 1993 and 2000 for his book The Russian People and Foreign Policy (2002), 84% of Russian political and
economic elites and 79% of the public perceive the failure to handle domestic problems as a security threat for
Russia. The Concept admits that the lack of economic development is becoming a security threat: “Russia’s national
interests may be assured only on the basis of sustainable economic development”. A weak economy undermines
Russia’s “ability to defend itself” and Russia’s capacity to be a global power. At the same time, the Concept admits
that “adverse trends in the economy lie at the root of the separatist aspirations of a number of constituent parts of
the Russian federation”. Putin’s main priority for Russia is therefore economic development. He understands that
only an economically strong Russia will be able to fulfil other ambitions. In this light it is easy to understand Putin’s
pragmatic reasons to seek  rapprochement  with  the  West,  especially  after  11  September,  when  the  window of
opportunity  for  closer  Russia-U.S.  relations  was  opened widely.  Since  then,  Putin  has  made  several  relevant
concessions to the United States: he accepted the deployment of U.S. troops in the Central Asian states during the
campaign in Afghanistan and he put a good face on Washington’s decision to opt out of the ABM Treaty and on
NATO’s expansion eastwards. Among the old threats to Russian security, however, the U.S. and NATO remain the
most  serious ones.  “The  desire  of  some  states (...)  to  diminish  the  role  of  existing mechanisms for  ensuring
international security, above all the United Nations and the OSCE, NATO’s eastward expansion, and the possible
emergence of foreign military bases and major military presences in the immediate proximity of Russian borders”
are cited in the Concept as fundamental threats for Russia in the international sphere.
These new and old threats make contradictory demands on the leadership. The economic development that Putin is
striving  for  will  mostly  come  from  rapprochement  with  the  West  and  to  Western-led  international  economic
organisations. Integration in the West seems, from this point of view, inescapable. This is however the same West
that is considered one of the fundamental military threats for Russia, the same West that demands from Russia
economic sacrifices on behalf of Western security needs (i.e. economic deals with Iran, Iraq and North Korea), the
same West that competes with Russia for geopolitical  and geoeconomic influence on former Soviet territory (i.e.
Central Asia and the Caucasus). As a consequence, Russian foreign policy is unstable, sometimes even erratic, as if
there were more than one. Putin is only partly in control, and his success at home depends as much on what he does
as on what Western powers do. Public opinion is so far his strength, even on such a sensitive issue as NATO. The
security and foreign policy establishments are his weakness.
Public opinion, NATO and the West
Putin is known for tracking public opinion closely and working to meet its expectations. According to all surveys,
Russian public opinion sees NATO and the West as a security threat for Russia. The 2000 New Russian Barometer
shows that 48% of respondents perceive the US as a substantial threat; 68% in Zimmerman’s 2000 survey; 52%
according to the 2002 Public Opinion Foundation survey. Following Zimmerman’s 1999 survey, 65% of the Russian
public and 59% of Russian political and economic elites perceive the spread of NATO in Eastern Europe as a security
threat; 40% according to the June 2002 VCIOM survey, a bit less than in 1999, but still a considerable figure. Much
as it may seem that this is a limitation to the pro-Western policy pursued by a president who likes to cultivate public
support, there are many advantages on Putin’s side in his struggle to maintain high popularity ratings. Public opinion
supports Putin and Putin’s foreign policy. According to a July 2002 survey by VCIOM, 73% of Russians approve of
Putin’s performance. This figure has been above 70% since December 1999. By a majority, they also approve of his
foreign  policy  (74%), of  the  full  support  he  gave to American  actions against  international  terrorism after  11
September (77%), and even of his recent contacts with Iraq, Iran and North Korea (57%). Also, 57% think Putin
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has coped successfully with strengthening Russia’s international position (VCIOM, June and August 2002). If there
were to be presidential  elections now, a majority of Russians would vote for Putin (56%), followed by Gennady
Zyuganov (10%), far behind Putin in voting intention (VCIOM, June 2002). There is no rival for Putin on the political
scene right now. Moreover, despite popular consideration of NATO and the US as a security threat for Russia, a
majority thinks that at present Russia should strengthen its collaboration with NATO, a figure that has been growing
since 1999 until now. In May 2002, 62% were advocates of this collaboration, 58% in September 2001 and 45% in
July  1999 (Public Opinion  Foundation, May 2002). This is also true of  regional  elites. According to the survey
conducted by ROMIR in September 1999, no matter how bad an opinion regional elites had about NATO, 78% said
that the best option when dealing with NATO was to cooperate but not to join and only 11% said Russia should avoid
all cooperation. The June 2002 VCIOM survey shows that although 40% of respondents perceive NATO expansion as
a threat, nearly as many (39%) either do not consider NATO expansion a threat or think it strengthens Russian
security. When asked about what Russia should do in response to NATO expansion in 1997, the Russian public was
quite prudent, as Zimmerman has found out (2002: 189). In fact, the first wave of NATO expansion did not produce
the adverse policy reaction Western critics of expansion had considered probable. At the same time, the figures
corresponding to those who don’t know about foreign policy questions is generally quite high: 21% do not know
about the consequences for Russian security of NATO eastward expansion; 21% do not know whether Russia should
strive to join NATO; 23% do not know how Russia should react to an American attack on Iraq (VCIOM, March and
June 2002); as many as 60% do not know where the interests of Russia and NATO coincide or differ (Public Opinion
Foundation, May 2002). All this provides Putin a wide room of manoeuvre to convince public opinion of the goodness
of his policy. Popular support for Putin does not seem to put his pro-Western foreign policy at risk. If anything,
Russian public opinion is on the whole quite pragmatic about the rapprochement with NATO: even if they are not
happy about it, they see it as a necessary step given the present conditions for Russia in the international sphere.
Just as Putin does (or precisely, why Putin does?). As Zimmerman has concluded after a careful analysis of Russian
people and foreign policy: “Whatever the role of mass publics in Russian foreign policy making, it has not been one
that increased the likelihood of Russian foreign policy risk-taking in response to NATO actions” (2002: 213).
The relevance of public opinion does not, to be sure, rest on its ability to influence in a direct way the foreign policy
decisions of the political  leadership. After  all, the fate of ministers and high-ranking officials in  Russia depends
almost exclusively on the will of the president. However, who the president is depends increasingly on the will of the
people.  Putin  knows  it,  and this  is  why  he  cherishes  public  opinion.  Therefore,  Putin  now needs  to  sell  his
rapprochement with NATO to the Russian public. Given his popularity ratings and the public support for his foreign
policy, he is in a good position to get people to trust him on this. The only obstacle could come from the fact that
Russians perceive NATO as a security threat. Putin must therefore convince them that NATO is not a threat for
Russia. He can do this by showing the Russian public the possible advantages of closer relations with NATO and the
West. Some of these advantages are directly appealing for the Russian public: NATO could help Russia with its much
needed military reform (in fact, the decay of the Russian military is such that it is becoming a security threat for its
own people);  cooperation  with  NATO and the  US would help Russia  to  fight  international  terrorism around its
borders;  a  good relationship with  NATO,  based on  mutual  confidence,  would allow Russia  to  free  up military
resources to fight other more pressing threats, such as the southern and eastern borders. Moreover, since closer ties
with NATO imply closer ties with the West in general, Russia could get support to develop its economy and facilitate
one of the country’s priorities, the international integration of the Russian economy (Security Concept, 2000).
Nevertheless, all  the possible advantages of cooperating and getting closer to NATO will  not be credible for  the
Russian public unless NATO gives Putin something to present at home. US unilateralism in the international arena
since 11 September and its determination to attack Iraq is not helping Putin much in the direction of confidence-
building towards NATO among the Russian people. Russian public opinion is highly volatile over foreign policy issues.
Particular  events  can  have  a  big,  although  transient,  effect  on  its  mood.  Until  1997  the  Russian  public  was
surprisingly unaware of the NATO issue, as various surveys demonstrate (Zimmerman, 2002; ROMIR, 1997). This
could be the reason why they responded prudently to NATO’s first eastward expansion. It was only after the bombing
of  Serbia  in  1999  that  concern  about  NATO  was  evident  among  Russians  (Zimmerman,  2002)  and  that
anti-American and anti-Western attitudes began to spread. The Serbia effect has been waning over time, especially
after the attacks of 11 September on US soil and the formation of an anti-terrorist international coalition. However,
a unilateral attack on Iraq by the US could take things back to where they were in 1999 for Russian public opinion
on NATO. In fact, asked about an eventual US attack on Iraq, 53% of respondents to a VCIOM survey (August 2002)
show themselves against it while 27% approve. Furthermore, only 1% thinks Russia should participate in the attack
and only  14% think Russia should support  the attack but  not participate. The survey also shows that  42% of
respondents, a clear majority, believe that Russia should stay on the sidelines, but remain an ally of US in the
anti-terrorist  coalition  -again,  a  prudent  reaction.  Pragmatism  seems  to  guide  the  Russian  public,  much  in
consonance with Putin’s foreign policy during the last year. Pragmatism, however, is a conjectural factor, not built
upon confidence, and for the Russia-NATO Council to have supporters inside Russia, confidence-building is in the
long term more important than context-bounded pragmatism. The NATO Prague summit next November offers the
best opportunity to start in this direction.
Opposition in the foreign policy and security establishments
Putin’s wish to cooperate with NATO is not widely shared by the foreign and defence officials he will have to rely on
to make  the  whole  thing work.  The 2000  Security  Concept,  which  guides Russian  defence  policy  and military
strategy, considers NATO a security threat and, therefore, an organisation against which Russia should defend itself.
The Concept perceives NATO as using force freely and believes that NATO would not hesitate to use force against
Russia  over  political  disagreements.  Moreover,  the  Concept  recognises  Russia’s  weakened conventional  forces,
unable to resist a large-scale conventional attack by NATO. True, the Concept was influenced by the threatening
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events of previous years, beginning with NATO expansion and followed by Western criticism of Russia’s military
campaign  in  Chechnya  and  by  the  NATO  attacks  against  Serbia.  The  situation  after  11  September  changed
considerably in this respect. After the anti-terrorist international coalition was forged, Putin repeteadly declared in
public that NATO was not a threat for  Russia anymore, that the relations between Russia and NATO should be
perceived more like allies than enemies. However, the President’s declarations have not been enough to counteract
resistance  inside  the  military.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  Putin’s  siding  with  the  West  is  not  backed by  a  credibly
pro-Western military strategy. For  the military, NATO is still  a potential  adversary. To change this would imply
changing many cherished things in  the  military  establishment,  such  as the  size  and organisation  of  the army
(conscription as opposed to a professional  army), or  the excess of generals, and removing the last obstacles to
reform. The defence minister Sergey Ivanov seems to be siding with the generals’ interests in everything concerned
with the reform of the military and with relations with the West. Disagreements between minister Ivanov and Putin
are becoming evident, despite the fact that Ivanov was, when appointed, Putin’s man of confidence. Their public
statements are increasingly disonant. When Ivanov says that “the appearance of new NATO members in Europe, not
subject to the existing arms control measures, will have a disastrous effect on the framework of treaties in general”,
Putin  declares that “preventing Estonia’s membership of NATO would be incorrect tactically  and strategically. If
Estonia wants that, let it join NATO”. They have also disagreed publicly on how much to support the US after 11
September. More worringly, on 6 June, Ivanov declared that Russia was refusing to participate in NATO’s autumn
summit in Prague “on account of its disagreement over the expansion of the Alliance”. At the first session of the
Russia-NATO Council  Ivanov warned: “I ask you not to be deluded into expecting breakthrough, epoch-making
decisions or anything like that. This is like starting first grade at school for the first time.” Scepticism and mistrust
are widespread among the security establishment. Putin can of course launch foreign policy decisions without the
support of these establishments. He has no political rival and the regime he has established in Russia provides him
with a docile press and a docile, even supportive (with few exceptions), parliament. However, Putin will not be able
to force the correct implementation of his decisions. The generals may try to sabotage his new relations with NATO,
much as they have done with the implementation of military reforms.
Conclusion
Putin has only two choices ahead: he must either convince the foreign and security establishments that NATO is not
a military threat for Russia anymore or purge these bodies of its most recalcitrant officials. The first one is difficult
and slow. The second one could be politically risky for him. Convincing the foreign policy and security establishments
that NATO is not a threat is something Putin cannot do alone. NATO´s next eastward expansion leaves many things
uncertain: will the new members deploy the military structures of other countries on their territory? Will they make
their territory available for the deployment of nuclear weapons? Will they comply with the treaty on conventional
weapons in Europe? Questions like these make the Russian military suspicious about the non-threatening character
of NATO expansion. Therefore they tend to see the new Russia-NATO Council as a phony attempt to establish a true
partnership. This perception is strengthened by the Alliance’s closer contacts with other post-Soviet countries and its
lack of control over US unilateralism. Confidence-building measures among NATO and Russia are therefore of utmost
importance to set this relationship on the right track. Concerning expansion, NATO should be able to attend to
Russia’s legitimate sensitivities. And it should also be able to collaborate with Russia in the Caucasus and Central
Asia rather than engage in geopolitical competition. This would make things easier for Putin at home.
Putin’s striving for Russia’s economic recovery makes it unlikely that he will change his mind about the need for
close ties with NATO and the West. He might on the other hand make tactical moves in order to press the West into
delivering the benefits he seeks and to silence internal opposition. We, as members of NATO, should be able to
distinguish between tactical moves and a change of strategy, and act accordingly. The stakes are high for European
security.
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